

news release



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THE

AMERICAN LEGION

National Public Relations Division

NOTICE TO EDITORS, CORRESPONDENTS, PIX
EDITORS, RADIO AND TV DESKS, FEATURE WRITERS

IMMEDIATE RELEASE

FACT SHEET

THE AMERICAN LEGION 43rd NATIONAL
CONVENTION, DENVER, COLORADO,
SEPTEMBER 9 - 14, 1961

NATIONAL CONVENTION HEADQUARTERS

The Denver-Hilton Hotel, Exhibit Hall
1-B. Opening date - Sept. 5, 8:00 a.m.
(*Mountain Time) Telephone: CHERRY
4-4373. National Public Relations
may be reached at this number.

RICHARD M. NIXON

Former Vice President of the United
States will be the main speaker at
the dinner of National Commander of
The American Legion, William R.
Burke, of Los Angeles, Tuesday,
Sept. 12th, main ballroom, Denver-
Hilton Hotel, approximately 8:30 p.m.
Mr. Nixon is a member of Whittier
(Calif.) Post 51.

HARRY S. TRUMAN

Former President of the United
States will speak at the final
session on Sept. 14th at 11:00 a.m.
Mr. Truman is a life member of Tirey
J. Ford Post 21 of Independence, Mo.

YOUTHFUL VIPS

Presentation of representatives of
The American Legion's Youth Programs,
Sept. 12 - 11:45 a.m., Denver
Auditorium:

Robert J. O'Connell (New York)
Oratorical Contest Winner

John C. Sulerud, Jr. (Minnesota)
Eagle Scout

Jefferson J. Jarvis (Texas)
Boys' Nation President

To be announced
Legion Baseball Player of Year

NATIONAL COMMANDER'S PRESS CONFERENCE William R. Burke, National Commander,
will hold his first press conference on
Thursday, Sept. 7 - 3:30 p.m. in the
Onyx Room, Brown Palace Hotel. Properly
certified members of the press, radio
and TV are invited to attend.

(*All times are Mountain Time)

WORLD'S LARGEST CONVENTION

Approximately 40,000 to 50,000 American Legionnaires and their families will attend the 1961 National Convention, which is the world's largest. Legionnaires from all 50 Departments of the Legion in the United States will be augmented by groups from the 8 foreign departments. There will be 2,997 delegates and a like number of alternates.

BUSINESS SESSIONS

Commission and committee meetings will run from Sept. 8th to 14th, and are listed in the official program. The official business sessions of the convention will begin Tuesday, Sept. 12th - 9:00 a.m., in the Denver Auditorium, and will continue through Sept. 14th. This is the basic business procedure of the national convention which is concluded by the election of a new American Legion National Commander on Sept. 14th.

NATIONAL PARADE SPECTACLE

The Legion's annual big spectacle of glitter, color, pageantry, breathtaking floats, interspersed with the Nation's finest marching band units, that comprise the National Convention parade, will commence at 10:00 a.m., Sept. 11th and last from 10 to 12 hours.

DRUM & BUGLE CORPS FINALS

Juniors - Saturday, Sept. 9th
Bear Stadium, Denver

Seniors - Sunday, Sept. 10th
Denver University Stadium, Denver

INDEPENDENT PUBLISHER'S AWARD

National Commander Burke will present "The National Commander's Award" to Palmer Hoyt, Editor and Publisher of the Denver Post, as "The Independent Publisher of the Year," Sept. 12th, 12:40 p.m., Denver Auditorium

FOURTH ESTATE AWARDS

Each year, The American Legion makes its "Fourth Estate Awards" to those organizations the National Public Relations Commission considers have contributed the most to freedom of public expression. Two awards will be made this year:

(MORE)

FOURTH ESTATE AWARDS (Cont'd)

Jack Howard, President of the Scripps-Howard Newspapers will be given a Fourth Estate Award for the accomplishment of that newspaper chain in alerting the country to perils of communism.

Jack Warner, President of Warner Brothers Pictures, Inc., will be given a Fourth Estate Award for his personal contribution to the motion picture industry by correlating sound to the motion picture camera, and for using this mass communication device in combatting tyranny.

Presentation: Sept. 12 - 12:50 p.m.
Denver Auditorium

OTHER CONVENTION SPEAKERS

Sept. 12-11:00 A. M. - Mrs. Henry H. Ahnemiller, National President, American Legion Auxiliary

Dr. George K. C. Yeh
Ambassador of the Republic of China

John S. Gleason, Jr.
Administrator of Veterans Affairs

Sept. 12 - 11:30 a.m., Admiral George W. Anderson, Chief of Naval Operations

Sept. 13 - 12:45 p.m., General Ralph M. Osborne, Former Berlin Troop Commander

Sept. 14 - 10:00 a.m., General Curtis E. LeMay, Air Force Chief of Staff

PRESS CONTACTS

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Charles J. Arnold, Director
Public Relations Division
C. D. (Deke) DeLoach, Chairman
Public Relations Commission

IMPORTANT TELEPHONE NUMBERS

DENVER POST - MA. 3-2121; ROCKY
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UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL - AL. 5-1428
UPI NEWS PICTURES - KE. 4-3333 (xt.310)
KBTW(ABC) AM. 6-3601; KLZ-TV (CBS)
MA. 3-4271; KOA-TV (NBC.) CH. 4-4141;
KTVR-TV (Independent) KE. 4-8281

THE NEW YORK TIMES, MONDAY, MARCH 27, 19

Intelligence—I

Merger of Separate Service Agencies Is Being Proposed to Curb Rivalries

By HANSON W. BALDWIN

The merger or centralization of the separate intelligence services of the armed forces, now under study in the Pentagon, offers seeming advantages but at the risk of major dangers.

Today, each of the services maintains its own intelligence division or branch—the Office of Naval Intelligence; the G-2, or intelligence branch of the Army, and the Air Force A-2 section. The Joint Staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff also maintains a Joint Intelligence Group.

Maj. Gen. Graves B. Erskine, (Marine Corps, retired), head of the Office of Special Operations, has long been an assistant to the Secretary of Defense in the intelligence, security, unconventional warfare and psychological warfare field. He also monitors the National Security Agency.

The National Security Agency, an agency of the Department of Defense, staffed by military personnel and civilians, deals with communications, intelligence, codes and ciphers.

Outside of the Department of Defense there are other important intelligence collection and evaluation agencies. The most important are the Central Intelligence Agency, headed by Allen W. Dulles, the top echelon national intelligence agency, charged with the coordination and evaluation of intelligence on the national or strategic level; the Federal Bureau of Investigation, charged particularly with counter-espionage; the State Department's intelligence activities, and those of the Atomic Energy Commission.

A Pyramidal System

There are two key groups responsible for coordinating and meshing all these intelligence activities. Within the Pentagon, a Joint Intelligence Committee, composed of Army, Navy, Air Force and Joint Intelligence Group heads, formulates joint military intelligence. At a higher level, the Intelligence Advisory Committee, chaired by Mr. Dulles and composed of heads or representatives of all the principal intelligence agencies, meets once a week to review and approve various national intelligence estimates.

It is the Pentagon part of this system that appears to be threatened with reorganization by the new regime in the Department of Defense. What form such a reorganization would take is not clear as yet; studies are still under way. But given the organizational philosophy of some of the civilians in the new Pentagon team, and suggestions that have been made in the past, it seems clear that more centralization of intelligence at Department of Defense level is being investigated.

Merger, or centralization of all of the services' intelligence activities, has some superficial attractions. There is no doubt that the services have some-

times utilized inflated estimates of enemy strengths to strengthen their budget requests to Congress. There have been marked differences of opinion between the services—based on differing intelligence estimates—about Soviet missile strength, and, some years ago, about Soviet bomber strength. Each service has a natural tendency to stress those elements of Soviet strength with which it is most concerned.

Merging of G-2, O. N. I. and A-2 at Department of Defense level would, presumably, force the elimination of varying service estimates in favor of one military estimate. It would downgrade the individual service viewpoint and upgrade the collective military viewpoint, thus dampening one facet of interservice differences. At the same time such a change would carry the trend of past years toward centralization of power in the Department of Defense and reduction of the service departments and the individual services much further, since intelligence is the handmaiden of policy and provides the facts upon which it must be based.

It would also, of course, strengthen the control of the Secretary of Defense, since he would preside directly over one common department of intelligence agency rather than over many separate agencies, each now indirectly responsible to the Secretary through other departments or agencies. Theoretically, too, the simplification of organization appears attractive.

But these potential gains are far outweighed by the probable risks.

Intelligence—II

Major Dangers Scented in Merger Of Services' Information Agencies

By HANSON W. BALDWIN

The merging of service intelligence units at the Department of Defense level poses several major dangers.

In the past, intelligence has always been a function of command. It is true that the functions of command, both in Washington and in the field, have been gradually limited since

World War II by the "civilianization" of the services and the usurpation of command functions in the

service departments by the increasing centralization in the Department of Defense. Legally, the Chief of Naval Operations and the other chiefs now command nothing; command is exercised through the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a corporate body and the unified commanders overseas.

Nevertheless, intelligence in the field—at regimental, ship or air group level, which the services call tactical intelligence—is and must remain a function of command. Yet the tactical intelligence officers depend for a great flow of background and strategic information such as order of battle of the enemy, technical descriptions of enemy equipment and weapons and so on upon their parent service organizations in the Pentagon. In fact, without these organizations—G-2 of the Army, A-2 of the Air Force, the Office of Naval Intelligence—to collate and digest field reports and the reports of military, air and naval attachés, and to evaluate, study and disseminate to the field, masses of other information, the intelligence officers in the field would be military orphans, a body without a head.

Other Dangers Scented

The proposed merger of service intelligence agencies also poses another danger: that the specialized and detailed "nuts-and-bolts" intelligence data of major interest to each of the three services might well be neglected or downgraded by a higher level agency. A merged, nonservice-oriented intelligence agency might well concentrate on high level or strategic intelligence and neglect some of the basic land, sea and air data.

The most dangerous aspect of a merged intelligence service is the emphasis it would inevitably place on "agreed" or "collective" estimates. Intelligence data, by their very nature, cannot be precise, except in a few instances. There are bound to be varying estimates of the details of enemy strengths, and when these are projected into the future, as intelligence attempts to do, the uncertainties and hence the differences are even greater. The danger of a merged intelligence is the danger that differences would be suppressed, or so far downgraded that minority views would never reach the eyes of the Secretary of Defense or of the President.

Under the present system dissents from factual estimates or interpretations are indicated by the dissenting group in footnotes or in other explanatory material; the nature of the dissent and the reason for it is given.

Present dissents although sometimes sharp and definite (as, for instance about Soviet missile strength), do not impair the basic value of the estimates. What they do do is to make the task of the policy-maker harder; he must take into consideration two or more estimates of enemy strength.

But, for the security of the country it is highly important that this disagreeable extra work be undertaken and that these safety factors provided by the privilege of dissent be in-

sured. Sir Winston Churchill took a leaf from his own experience in commenting adversely upon the dangers of agreed intelligence, which he called "this form of collective wisdom." The British Joint Intelligence Committee in 1941 rejected indications that the Germans were about to attack Russia, though Sir Winston as early as March, saw raw or unevaluated intelligence reports that convinced him that invasion of Russia was impending.

The importance of such dissenting opinions or estimates is emphasized for the United States by the Yalta conference. The military value of Russia's participation in the Pacific war hinged in considerable part at that time on the status of Japan's famed Kwantung Army in Manchuria. If this army, Japan's finest prior to World War II, was intact and strong, Soviet aid would probably be needed, our military commanders believed, to pin it down, to defeat it and to prevent the prolongation of the war on the mainland.

A minority group in both the Office of Naval Intelligence and in Army G-2 felt that the Kwantung Army was a hollow shell; its crack divisions, they maintained, had been shifted out of Manchuria to defend the Pacific islands and the homeland. But the "collective" and "agreed-upon" intelligence estimate furnished to the Joint Chiefs of Staff prior to Yalta said that the Kwantung Army was exceedingly strong and that without Russian assistance the war might continue until 1948. But there were no indicated dissents in the collective estimate; the minority opinions never reached the top levels of policy making, and this erroneous estimate undoubtedly influenced the military and the political judgments at Yalta.

Policy Making Stressed

If so serious a mistake could have occurred with the separate service intelligence agencies of those days functioning, how much more likely is a recurrence if they should be merged into one monolithic structure.

There is a final danger. Intelligence collection and evaluation must never be confused with policy making. The merging of service intelligence organizations at the Secretary of Defense level might well produce a more closely integrated and agreed upon collective military estimate than the present system does. But any such monolithic agency so close to the throne of policy-making power in the Pentagon might well be susceptible to policy influence; the facts might subconsciously be distorted to suit the policy, rather than vice versa. This is not an idle fear: Sir Winston spoke of it in the House of Commons in 1939:

"It seems to me that Ministers run the most tremendous risks if they allow the information collected by the Intelligence Department * * * to be shifted and colored and reduced in consequence and importance, and if they ever get themselves into a mood of attaching weight only to those pieces of information which accord with their earnest and honorable desire that the peace of the world should remain unbroken."

It is the trend of human nature—hard to resist—to interpret facts to accord with preconceived prejudices. It must be guarded against to the utmost in intelligence work. The proposed merger of our service intelligence sections would facilitate this error rather than reduce it. The old American principle of checks and balances is as applicable to intelligence collection and evaluation as it is to administration.

TRANSMITTAL SLIP		DATE 6 September 1961
TO: John Warner		
ROOM NO. 221	BUILDING East	
REMARKS: <div style="text-align: center; margin-top: 100px;">Per our telecon.</div> <div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 100px; height: 100px; margin: 20px auto;"></div> <div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 250px; height: 40px; margin: 20px auto;"></div>		
FROM: Stanley J. Grogan Assistant to the Director		
ROOM NO. 11	BUILDING East	EXTENSION <div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 50px; height: 15px;"></div>

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